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Distributed Joint Rate and Power Control
Game-Theoretic Algorithms for Wireless Data
M. Hayajneh, Student Member, IEEE, and C. T. Abdallah, Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—In this letter, we consider two distributed game theoretic algorithms to jointly solve the problem of optimizing the
transmission rates and transmit powers for future wireless data
communication systems. We then establish the existence, uniqueness and Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria of both games.
Index Terms—Game theory, joint rate and power, Pareto efficiency.

the path gain from the th transmitter to the th receiver. This
gain may represent spreading gain and/or cross correlation between codes in CDMA systems or any gain that captures the
effect of a fading channel.
The game
that optimally allocates the transmission rates
for all users is given by

(1)

I. INTRODUCTION

T

RANSMITTERS in multimedia wireless networks may
require different quality of services (QoS) in order to establish a communication link with a receiver. Providing flexible transmission rates for each transmitter/receiver pair and efficient use of the shared radio resources requires joint power and
rate control optimization algorithms. Earlier work in this arena
used centralized algorithms (c.f. [1]). Due to the difficulty of implementing centralized algorithms, and to avoid control signals
that cause delays in the system operation, distributed algorithms
were proposed. Game theory was shown to be an appropriate
tool for finding power control algorithms in [7]–[10] and for rate
flow control algorithms in [4] and [5]. In particular, the authors
in [7] proposed a utility based joint power and rate optimization algorithm, but the resulting Nash equilibrium (NE) point
was Pareto inefficient and to guarantee the uniqueness of NE the
rates of all users were forced to be equal. In this letter, we use
game theory framework for finding a pure distributed algorithms
for the joint rate and power control optimization problem. To
solve the problem, we propose two, layered, but noncooperative
priced games as follows: The first game
allocates the optimal
transmission rates for all users, then provides the second game
with a vector of constants . The second game
uses to evaluate the optimal transmit power levels that support the resulting
Nash equilibrium transmission rates of game
.

where
,
is the pricing factor broadcasted by the base station (BS) to all users, and (which measures the willingness of user to pay) is the utility factor of the
th user locally selected based on the desired transmission rate.
Finally, is a constant selected such that
, and
is the minimum required transmission rate. The first term of
is chosen to maximize the transmission rate of user , while the
second term works as a barrier to prevent the th user’s rate from
going below
, and to fairly allocate the transmission rates.
The goal of
is to prevent the greedy use of the available
channel capacity.
Game
below, allocates the transmit power levels that support the resulting Nash equilibrium rates ,
of game
.

(2)
is the effective interference that user needs to overcome.
Vectors
and
are the vectors of transmission rates and
transmit powers of all users except for the th user, and is the
signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) defined by

II. SYSTEM SETUP AND OUR APPROACH
Consider transmitter/receiver pairs (users) in a mobile cellular network. The th transmitter,
transmits at a power level from its convex strategy space
to the th receiver and sends data at a rate from its convex
strategy space . The received power level at the th receiver
from the th transmitter is given by
where
is
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(3)

In applications where the spectrum and power are limited resources, it is recommended to use a spectrally and power efficient modulation technique such as M-QAM. An empirical link
rate model for -QAM of user is given by [2]:
(4)
where
with
is the target BER
of user and is a system constant. In this letter we use the
following approximation of (4) at high SIR [1]:
(5)
where
is normalized by the channel bandwidth with units,
nats/s/Hz. A user can change the transmission rate by adapting
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different modulation formats (e.g., 2-QAM, 4-QAM, …).
Therefore, the transmission rate of each user belongs to a
discrete set, but we assume in this letter that the transmission
rates are continuous for simplicity. In Section III we establish
the existence, uniqueness and optimality of the equilibrium
point
of both games.

B. Non-Cooperative Power Control Game With Pricing
To find the maximizing

for game

(8)
and by substituting for the value of
power level is thus given by

III. EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM

we evaluate:

, the maximizing transmit

A. Non-Cooperative Rate Control Game
With Pricing (NRGP)

(9)

The optimization problem of the th user defined in game
is to find the transmission rate from the strategy space that
maximizes the utility function defined in (1). To do so, we set
(6)
The maximizing transmission rate of user ,

is thus given by
(7)

and
. Note that
,
, which means that
is a strictly
concave function of . Therefore,
is a quasiconcave function optimized on a convex set
, and game theory results
guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium point [3]. In the
remainder of this section we prove the uniqueness of this Nash
equilibrium point. We first need the following result.
Proposition 1: For game
defined in (1), the best response
of user , given the transmission rates vector of the other users
is given by:
,
where
is the maximum allowed transmission rate in the th
user’s strategy space .
Proof: Define the best response function
of the
th user as the best action that user can take to attain the
maximum pay off given the other users’ actions
. That is,
,
where this set contains only one point [9]. From (7),
is the
unconstrained maximizer of the target function , i.e.,
. Since
is negative
, this
maximizer is unique. Now, assume that is not feasible, that is,
, then user will get his/her maximum at
since
the target function is increasing on the set
. This
implies that
is the best response of user given
.
The following theorem, proven in [6], guarantees the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium operating point of game
.
Theorem 1: If a power control algorithm with a standard best
response function has a Nash equilibrium point, then this Nash
equilibrium point is unique.
See [6] for the definition of a standard function. Theorem 1
allows us to state the following lemma, whose proof is omitted.
Lemma 1: In game
, the best response vector of all users
given by
where

is a standard vector function. Therefore, by theorem 1, game
has a unique Nash equilibrium point
.

The transmit power level represents the minimal power (i.e.,
without waste) required to support the optimal transmission rate
, Note that
,
. Therefore,
is a strictly concave function, and using the same arin
, there exists a Nash equilibrium point
gument for
in game
. In what follows we prove
the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium point of game
by
proposing the best response of user in game
similarly to
proposition 1.
Proposition 2: For game
defined in (2), the best response
of user , given the transmit power levels vector of the other
users
is given by:
,
where
is the maximum transmit power level in the th
user’s strategy space .
Then, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium operating point
can be proved similarly to game
since the best response
vector of users in
given as
is also a standard function. The following Lemma then guarantees Pareto optimality (efficiency) of the equilibrium point
of both NRGP and NPGP games
and
, respectively.
Lemma 2: The Nash equilibrium point
of the NRGP
and NPGP game
is Pareto optimal. Mathematgame
ically speaking, for
,
:
,
and
for some
, with
component wise. For
,
:
,
and
for some
, with
component wise.
Proof: We already know from (6) that
(10)

where

, therefore (10) can be written as
(11)

Without loss of generality, let
,
,
. Then we have the following:

where

(12)
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In order to find out how
the first-order derivative of
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behaves with , we need to find
with respect to as follows:

(13)
. One can check easily
,
. Henceforth,
,
, that is,
is decreasing
over
for all users, and by this we conclude that
is a Pareto optimal NE point of NRGP game
. To prove
that
is a Pareto optimal NE point of
, it is enough to
prove that
is the minimum required transmit power
to support
for all
. By re-writing (9) as:
,
And from (5), we conclude
the proof.
It was proven in [6] that both synchronous and asynchronous
algorithms with standard best response functions converge to
the same point. Therefore, we consider asynchronous power
and rate control algorithms which converge to the unique Nash
of games
and
. In this algoequilibrium point
rithm, the users update their transmission rates and powers in
the same manner as in [9]. Assume user updates its transmission rate at time instances in the set
, with
and
for all
. Let
where
with
and define to
be the transmission rates vector picked randomly from the total
strategy space
.
Algorithm 1: Consider the game
given in (1) and generate a sequence of transmission rates vectors as follows: (a)
Set the transmission rate vector at time
:
, let
(b) For all
, such that
: Given
,
calculate
, then let
the transmission rate
(c) If
stop and declare the Nash equilibrium
transmission rates vector as
, else let
and go to
(b). (d) For all
, calculate and provide it to algorithm 2.
When Algorithm 1 converges to , Algorithm 2 below finds
the optimal levels
to support . Suppose user updates its
power level at time instances in
, with
and
for all
. Let
where
with
and define a
.
randomly chosen power vector in
Algorithm 2: The game
as given in (2) generates a
sequence of power vectors as follows: (a) Set the power
vector at time
:
, let
. (b) For all
, such that
: Given
, then calculate
, then let the
(c) If
transmit power
stop and declare the Nash equilibrium power
vector as
, else let
and go to (b).
where
that

IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider a wireless data system with
receiver/transmitter pairs. The path gains
were generated
from a uniform distribution on
for all

Fig. 1. Normalized equilibrium rates of the game G1() and the normalized
minimum required rates of the users (+) in the upper graph and the equilibrium
powers of the game G2() in the lower graph versus the user index with pricing
= 10 , 8 i 2 N .
factor  = 10 , utility factors u = 10 , and

[1]. The additive-white-gaussian noise
and
. Game
was
(AWGN) variance was set
run for different values of the minimum transmission rates for
different users. Results show that all users were able to reach
reasonable transmission rates with low transmit power levels
resulting from game
as shown in the lower graph of Fig. 1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this letter two joint game-theoretic distributed rate and
power control algorithms for wireless data systems were proposed. We presented target functions which are composed of
the difference between a utility function and a pricing function
to set the rules of the games among the users. We established
the existence, uniqueness and Pareto optimality (efficiency) of
the Nash equilibrium point of both games. All 50 users in the
studied example were able to attain transmission rates that are
higher than their minimum required transmission rates at very
low transmit power levels.
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